A Hypothetical 'Arab League Report on Syria'

Arab League Report on Syria

WYP?

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The Current Situation in Syria

Bashar Al-Assad has ruled Syria since 2000, succeeding his father Hafez as President/dictator. However, in 2011, brutal government crackdowns during the Arab Spring protests sparked a civil war. The Arab League tried to arbitrate peace throughout November 2011 until January 2012, but Syria repeatedly reneged on its promises to cease the violence against civilians and the Arab League, therefore, suspended both its monitoring mission and Syria’s membership of the organisation. As an Alawite himself, Assad’s core support area is from Alawites concentrated along the Syrian coast, but he also has large support from the wider Shia, Christian and Druze population of Syria (Uludag, 2015). His military forces dropped from 220,000 in 2011 to 90,000 in 2016 but are well-trained and supplied and augmented through pro-government militias such as the National Defence Forces and Popular Defence Committees (University of Illinois, 2020). Pro-Assad forces retook the major city of Aleppo in 2016 and control most of the country.

Opposing Assad are various rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a coalition of military defectors and is the largest rebel force. However, there are also numerous other groups, such as Jabhat al Nusra, which are often more extreme Islamist militias (usually Sunni), and have often come into conflict with the FSA itself. Some rebel forces have also come into conflict with the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of predominantly Kurdish militias that mostly stays on the sidelines of the civil war (but led the fight against ISIS), to create stability and autonomous governance in the country’s Northeast. This practical and sectarian fragmentation, along with differing objectives within the rebel forces, is perhaps the main reason why they are on the cusp of losing the war and also what makes it difficult to negotiate a resolution to the conflict since there are so many actors involved.

ISIS, an Islamist militia aiming to create a Caliphate under Sharia Law, was a serious threat which took advantage of the chaos in Syria (and neighbouring Iraq), particularly after 2013 when they seized the major city of Raqqa and ultimately controlled a third of Syrian territory. However, after being tackled by all internal and external actors of the civil war, including a Western aerial campaign, they are no longer a major threat – particularly after Raqqa was retaken in 2017.

As forces external to Syria are regarded, Russia, Iran and China support the Assad regime and the USA, UK, EU and other Western countries support the moderate rebels, while Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia support all rebels, including Islamist groups. Russia supported Assad first through arms and later through air support, military advisors and special forces. Iran has supported Syria through its proxy Shia militia Hezbollah (considered a terrorist group by the US and EU), who number between 4000-8000 and operate out of Lebanon, and a further 5000-10,000 Iraqi Shiites fight for Assad (University of Illinois 2020). On the contrary, Western nations have only got involved to a limited degree by conducting airstrikes against Assad and ISIS, and are pulling out their forces, as the US did in 2019, thereby allowing Turkey to invade Kurdish-controlled Northern Syria. Despite the Kurds opposing Assad, Turkey’s internal security fears due to its large Kurdish population and issues with the PKK terrorist group mean it views any aspect of Kurdish autonomy as a threat and has therefore escalated conflict between the FSA and Kurds.

One major result of the war was the Syrian Refugee Crisis, as 4.8 million civilians (Ibrahim, 2017) fled their homes for refugee camps within and around Syria or sought asylum further afield, particularly in Europe, which destabilised the EU and led to a resurgence of far-right and anti-immigration politics.

Arab League Proposals to End the Conflict

The Arab League’s approach to peace is based on the following presumptions:

1.     That a federal solution (such as proposed by Ibrahim, 2017) to resolve ethno-religious differences and create a balance between opposing sides by dividing Syria into autonomous state, is not practical. Only the Kurds, as a distinct ethnic minority, support federalisation while both pro and anti-government forces adamantly oppose any division of Syria, which would also only create the basis for future sectarian conflict.

2.     That neither the rebels nor Assad regime can at this point definitively win the war: the rebels because Assad has regained control over much of the country, and Assad because of Turkish intervention and remaining dissent among civilians. Therefore, any escalation of the conflict will achieve nothing substantial; only be counter-productive and prolong the suffering of Syrian civilians.

3.     That in the light of failed peace processes by the USA, Russia and Turkey, any resolution to the conflict must be arbitrated by neutral parties such as the UN, to ensure trust and cooperation on all sides.

We, therefore, present the following proposals:

1.     All sides will agree on a ceasefire, under which regime and Turkish forces will withdraw from their occupied rebel and Kurdish areas, aid will be allowed to get through to civilians, and swaps of political and military prisoners will take place.

2.     Elections will be held for both a Parliament and the Presidency. These shall be jointly overseen by the UN, Arab League, USA and Russia to ensure trust and transparency, with neutral observers permitted free movement throughout Syria.

3.     Both sides will promise to uphold the results of that election, whatever they might be, and give amnesty to opposing soldiers and political figures. This transfer of power will again be overseen by the UN, Arab League, USA and Russia.

4.     The UN, Arab League, USA, EU, Russia, Turkey and any other countries housing refugees will support their return to Syria, while a join economic plan will be implemented to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure after a decade of devastation, and restore functionality to the state.

5.     UN and Arab League peacekeeping forces will maintain a presence across Syria over the next decade, to ensure good faith, stability and long-lasting peace.

Bibliography

Ibrahim, A, (2017), ‘Ending the Syrian Civil War: Is There a Federal Solution?’ Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 9(2), pp 141-66.

Uludag, M, (2015), ‘Syrian Civil War: Important Players and Key Implications – A Factsheet’, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7(7), pp 4-10.

University of Illinois, (2020), The Syrian Conflict: Pro-Assad, [Online], Accessed at: https://guides.library.illinois.edu/Syria/Pro-Assad, (Monday 24 November 2020)

By Yahye Elmi

Twitter: @ae_maestro